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Abstract
Over 42 years and 22 US congressional elections between 1972 and 2014,
Texas evolved from a state controlled by the Democratic Party since
Reconstruction to one dominated by the Republican Party. This thesis examines
the relationship between measures of district compactness and changing
demographics (decreasing non-Hispanic White percentage and increasing
Hispanic percentage) on a measure of electoral bias, as measured by a metric
called distortion during this transition. Distortion is the difference between the
percentage of seats won by a party with the percentage of votes it received in a
statewide congressional election. Using a general linear regression model, the
research finds that distortion decreases as compactness increases, while
demographic variables do not significantly affect distortion.

iv

Contents
I.
II.
III.

Introduction ................................................................................................... 1
Thesis Outline............................................................................................... 4
Literature Review: Congressional Redistricting ............................................ 5
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.

The Constitution, Important Laws, and the Courts. ................................. 7
Characteristics of “good” Redistricting .................................................... 9
Compactness ........................................................................................ 11
Partisan and Non-partisan Redistricting Approaches ............................ 14
Impact of Redistricting ........................................................................... 16
2013 and future redistricting trends. ...................................................... 18
Partisan Bias ......................................................................................... 19
Texas Redistricting................................................................................ 21
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

IV.

Gaming the system: the Republican takeover ................................ 23
Re-redistricting prior to the 2004 elections ..................................... 24
Packing, Cracking, and Fracking. ................................................... 26
2010 Census .................................................................................. 29
2012 Districts .................................................................................. 30

Methodology and Data ............................................................................... 32
A. Methodology.......................................................................................... 32
B. Data ...................................................................................................... 33
1.
2.

V.
VI.
VII.
VIII.

Dependent Variable - distortion ...................................................... 33
Independent Variables.................................................................... 37

Results and Discussion .............................................................................. 41
Conclusions ................................................................................................ 45
BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................... 51
APPENDIX A: MEASURING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF REDISTRICTING
PLANS........................................................................................................ 55

v

I.

Introduction
All 435 Representatives in the US House are elected every two years. Each state

has a number of representatives proportional to their state population (with a
minimum of one per state). Each congressional representative is elected from a
specific geographic district in the state. These districts within states are reconfigured
following the census conducted at the beginning of each new decade. States gain or
lose representatives based on how their population changes. The political party in
the state controlling the redistricting process designs congressional districts favoring
their party (with some constraints).1 The collective impact of who is elected to
represent every district in the US is profoundly important. It determines which party
controls the US House of Representatives. The process is anything but mundane.
This thesis tells a story about congressional redistricting in one state – Texas –
during a politically volatile period in its recent history as the state underwent a major
shift in political control, even as it experienced major demographic changes. This
research examines how compactness and demographic shifts had on the distortion
in Texas US House elections. Figure 1 shows the dramatic change. The transition
point in political control that occurred between 2002 and 2004 is a focus of this
thesis.
This study is about congressional redistricting - an extremely spatial activity. The
physical shape of districts is carefully crafted to include some spaces and people
and to exclude others. People responsible for redistricting frequently crowd certain

1

Twenty states have different types of committees responsible for developing redistricting plans (La
Raja 2009: 214).

1

groups of people together (packing) or dispense them between many districts
(cracking).

Figure 1. Outcomes of Texas Congressional Elections between 1972 and 2014.
In 1984, the owner of a small pest control company was elected to the US House
to represent his Sharpstown community outside Houston, Texas. Nineteen years
later (2003) he was elected Majority Leader in the US House of Representatives. He
wanted a bigger Republican majority in the US House2, and following the 2002
elections, convinced the Texas Republican Party to take an unprecedented action –
to re-redistrict Texas a second time following a census. Surviving several legal
challenges, these moves dramatically reshaped Texas congressional districts and
resulted in a momentous change in the balance of power in the Texas
Congressional delegation.
2

In reality, had Delay not forced the re-redistricting in Texas in 2003, the Republicans would have lost
control of the US House in the 2004 election (Jacobson 2005: 201).
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The man is Tom Delay,3 and his unprecedented successful re-redistricting of
Texas for a second time in one census decade provided the impetus for this thesis.
The Texas story told here exemplifies types of redistricting activities undertaken by
both major parties that occur around the country – including recent efforts to reredistrict states following intra-decade state elections.
What makes this Texas case study so important is that it serves as an example
of the implementation of the Republican Southern Strategy to gain additional
congressional seats in the US House in the latter part of the 20th century (LewisBeck et al 2008: 154-156; Kousser 2010: 368-371). More importantly, however, what
has happened in Texas since the early 1970s may serve as a harbinger of future
demographic shifts that are occurring in the United States over time. How the two
major parties deal with these changes will dictate which party controls the US House
of Representatives in the future.
Since the 2004 US House election, the Republicans have dominated the Texas
Congressional delegation. As the non-Hispanic White population percentage in
Texas continues to shrink over time and the percentage of Hispanic/Latinos (a
census term) grows, both parties will be challenged to capitalize on these
demographic shifts.
While many states have gained or lost a small number of seats between 1972
and 2014, what also makes Texas important is that during the last five census

3

His victory was pyrrhic. After being indicted for money laundering, he lost the Majority Leader
position in 2005, and resigned in disgrace from the House in 2006. His legal troubles stemmed from
charges that he manipulated funds related to funding selected candidates in the re-redistricting
process. He was tried and convicted of various charges in 2010. In 2013, an appeals court threw
out the verdict, and in 2014, another court rejected the effort of the prosecution to reverse the
appeal court’s decision
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redistricting cycles, it has increased its number of representatives by 50% (from 24
in 1972 to 36 in 2012). Following each census, the state has needed to carve out
new districts from old districts and adjust the geographic shape of impacted districts.
The first election using the new configuration occurs two years after each census.
That is, following the 1990 census, elections occurred in the new district shapes in
1992 and continued for an additional four elections until 2000.4 Then the cycle –
census and redistricting – began again.
As noted previously, Texas experienced a number of large demographic changes
during the 1972-2014 congressional elections. This paper examines what impact
they had on election bias as measured by distortion. Specifically, did declines in the
non-Hispanic White population, increases in the urban population, and increases in
the Hispanic population significantly influence the Democratic distortion variable and
what impact did changes in the compactness of congressional districts have on the
variable?

II. Thesis Outline
This thesis begins with a review of relevant literature covering several important
aspects of congressional redistricting, including foundational laws, judicial decisions,
compactness, partisan bias, and redistricting in Texas. Next, the methodology and
data section discusses the statistical approach used and the study variables. The
Results and Discussion section explains the findings and their implications for
redistricting policy. The paper concludes with comments about the implications of
the changes that occurred in Texas during this 42 year period, thoughts about future
4

In some cases court decisions rendered after the first post-census election required adjustments to
some districts and adjacent districts.
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Texas congressional races, and suggestions for additional areas of research
evaluating the distortion variable. Finally, the appendix analyzes the lasting impact of
redistricting over the five elections following each census and some suggestions for
further research.

III. Literature Review: Congressional Redistricting
The literature review in this thesis is unusually broad in an effort to provide
readers not familiar with congressional redistricting literature background on how
redistricting is viewed in the Political Science community. Few articles have been
written on redistricting in Geography journals such as Political Geography.
Redistricting of U.S. Congressional districts, as mandated by the U.S.
Constitution, is a contentious process - a “bloodsport” - well documented in the
academic literature (Aleinikoff and Issacharoff quoted in Manheim 2013: 574).
“Research on redistricting engages an enormously complex set of issues” (La
Raja 2009: 203) is a reasonable summary of what researchers face when dealing
with and trying to understand the redistricting process and its consequences.
Redistricting is a fundamental political activity associated with Democracies and
occurs in the U.S. after the decennial census conducted each new decade year. It is
profoundly spatial (Chen and Rodden 2013, Ricca et al 2013). “Redistricting is the
spatial redistribution of voters. The simple act of relocating a district boundary alters
the representational relationship for numerous voters and this can have considerable
electoral consequences.” (McKee 2013: 624) These new boundaries also disrupt
relationships previously established by representatives in their old districts. The
process results in new physical, economic, and social congressional districts.
5

Post census redistricting is done for many reasons including 1) when increases
or decreases in state population necessitate a change in the number of
representatives, 2) to precisely equalize district size reflecting changes in population,
3) to protect or hurt incumbents by cracking districts into several pieces, 4) to
maximize the advantage when a new party is in control of the state legislature and
governor’s office, or 5) because it is required by the courts (La Raja 2009, Ricca et
al 2013, Manheim 2013).
There are numerous potential consequences of redistricting such as changes in
polarization5, increases or decreases in marginal districts6, and development of
descriptive representation in majority-minority districts,7 where a member of a
minority is elected to the US House and, frequently, large numbers of minorities are
packed in a district (Chen 2013; La Raja 2009). These are all important, and there
has been much written on each of these topics, but they are not the primary focus of
this literature review.
The modern redistricting process has changed from an ad hoc process run by
local operatives to multi-million dollar operations with lawyers, social scientists, and
numerous other consultants (Galderisi and Cain 2013: 6). This layer of influence
adds immeasurably to the complexity of redistricting and redistricting research.

5

A spatial process of partisan realignment along ideological lines that increasingly polarizes the
parties.
6
The winner receives 60% or less of the popular vote
7

Creation of these special districts with at least 48 or 49% minority population is designed to
ensure representation of minorities in the US House of Representatives. These protected
districts were created after passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act responding to concerns
that minorities were being deprived of representation through districting maneuvers.

6

This examination of the literature looks at several literatures related to political
redistricting. It initially describes the qualities of good redistricting based on the
constitution, voting rights laws, normative social justice values - in addition to
numerous Supreme Court and other court decisions. It briefly reviews important
literature related to compactness and then examines the various legislative and nonlegislative approaches to redistricting. This section next considers new events that
can significantly impact voting practices and redistricting in the coming years. The
final part includes a lengthy review of literature involving Texas redistricting.

A.

The Constitution, Important Laws, and the Courts.

The foundational document for U.S. redistricting is the U.S. Constitution. It
dictates that state representatives to the U.S. House shall be apportioned following a
census taken at the beginning of every decade.8 The 14th and 15th amendments9
also directly impact elections. The Voting Rights Act (VRA) of 1965 and 1975 define
what can and cannot be done in conducting elections and in structuring district
boundaries. Subsequent amendments to the 1975 VRA have expanded protections
to other minority groups including Hispanics (La Raja 2009). The courts play an
increasingly important role in interpreting the constitution and the VRA, and they are
8

Article 1 Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution mandates an every state census be conducted every
ten years. It reads: “Representatives … shall be apportioned among the several States which may be
included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers…. The actual Enumeration shall be
made within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every
subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct.”
9
th
The 14 deals with civil rights [“No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens … without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”] Specifically, “redistricting plans must comply with the
equal representation principle; … not discriminate against minorities; … avoid excessive
th
gerrymandering” and other regulations (Manheim 2013). The short 15 amendment states “The right
of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the Unites States or by any
State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. The Congress shall have the
power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.” (U.S. Constitution)
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frequently heavily involved in the redistricting process itself (Cox 2005, McKee 2013,
Manheim 2013, Cottrill 2012, La Raja 2009).
Court intervention in the current era began with the 1962 Supreme Court
decision in Baker v. Carr, which set in motion subsequent suits contesting the
apportionment process in many states (La Raja 2009). The 1962 Court ruled it would
consider legislative apportionment questions (Sauter 2012). The plaintiff, Charles
Baker, brought suit against the state of Tennessee arguing the rural districts were
overrepresented because the state legislature had never reapportioned districts
based on equal populations. The Court agreed with the plantiff.
With that case, the federal courts became actively involved in assessing the
constitutionality of the districting plans of several states. In those cases the court
may dictate the state submit a new acceptable plan. Finding the newly submitted
plan unacceptable, the court can impose a districting plan on the state. A second
condition imposed by the Supreme Court, in an attempt to ensure the one person –
one vote proposition, requires districts have almost identical populations. This
constitutional requirement, reinforced by the courts, virtually ensured all districts
would be reshaped to some degree following a new census (Cox 2002: 19-20).
While partisanship in the legislature and governor’s office has always been
important, partisanship in the courts has become important as well. The makeup of
the courts can strongly impact approval (or disapproval) of districting plans and the
subsequent elections (Cox 2002: 23-26).
Legalities ensuring neutrality and the fair representation of minorities in
redistricting are complex. The courts over the recent decades have, for various

8

reasons, either approved or rejected proposed redistricting plans that create
majority-minority districts and other configurations (La Raja 2009). With the Supreme
Court’s interest in developing majority-minority districts to ensure minority
representation, it is ironic that the impact of this emphasis frequently results in the
packing excessive numbers of minority voters into heavily minority districts. Minority
representation is increased, but at the cost of generating more White-dominate
districts (Cameron, Epstein, and O'Halloran 1996: 794).
For all the maneuvering and manipulation of Congressional district boundaries by
political parties and the subsequent legal challenges, “the evidence that partisan
gerrymanders actually have their intended effect is mixed.” Redistricting does not
guarantee the anticipated success of its political designers (McKee 2013: 624).

B.

Characteristics of “good” Redistricting

Webster (2013: 4) reminds us there is a normative element to the redistricting
process. It has a central purpose:
“to provide the population quality representation on boards, commissions,
councils and in legislatures and Congress. High quality districting plans should
provide representation to the greatest number of population groups possible, a
notion that will clearly become of greater importance as the United States
becomes more demographically diverse with each census.”
Synthesis of the 14th and 15th amendments, the Voting Rights acts of 1965 and
1975, and many court decisions have established criteria that help define a good
redistricting plan. Among these are neutrality - no political party should take
advantage of these spatial configurations to win seats; population balance precisely equal numbers of people in each district; spatial contiguity – the
requirement that any place in the district can be reached without leaving the district;

9

and compactness - districts should be “’closely and neatly packed together.’” A
circular configuration is an idealized perfectly compact district shape (Ricca et al
2013: 226).
The impact of compactness and conformity to existing political boundaries can be
subtle. Engstrom (2005: 78), for example, finds voter turnout is not impacted by
either district compactness or conformity. Rather, his analysis suggests conformity
with media markets impacts voter turnout by affecting the ability of challengers to
gain name recognition. His analysis did not directly analyze how district constituents
voted but does challenge his own previous work suggesting compactness is
important.
“Good” redistricting also depends on one’s perspective. La Raja (2009: 211)
draws upon the 2002 Cox and Katz work, Elbridge Gerry’s Salamander: the
Electoral Consequences of the Reapportionment Revolution, in which they identify
two important themes used in redistricting and election studies. These are partisan
bias and responsiveness. Partisan bias is the comparison of party votes garnered in
relation to the number of congressional seats won. Responsiveness is the sensitivity
of seat changes in relation to changes in vote share. In a responsive environment, a
small change in vote share can generate a large change in congressional seats won
(or lost). State government control by one party tends to generate partisan bias by
packing the supporters of the opposition party into a minimum number of districts. A
divided government tends to reduce partisan bias and responsiveness by developing
incumbent-protected districts.

10

C.

Compactness

Until the 1962 Baker v. Carr decision, the U.S. Supreme Court did not interfere in
the redistricting process. Since then, it and many other courts have been active in
passing judgement on proposed redistricting plans. Since 1962, many other criteria
have been identified and established as measures against which these plans are
evaluated.
There are three primary and several secondary criteria. The primary criteria,
established prior to 1962, were equal population, contiguity, and compactness.
Subsequent ones include racial equality, preservation of government subdivisions,
preservation of communities of interest, preservation of the cores of prior districts,
and protection of incumbents (Webster 2013: 3; Ricca et al. 2013).
The compactness criterion is easy to conceptualize but difficult to specify or
explain. The term is easily defined as some variation of joined or packed together;
closely and firmly united.10 As of 2009, more than 36 states have statutes that
require their congressional districts be compact (Webster 2013: 7). The
compactness measure was challenged and became established law in the 1993
Shaw v. Reno divided Supreme Court decision (Webster 2013; Pildes and Niemi
1993). “The geography of election districts ‘is one area in which appearances do
matter.’” (Pildes and Niemi 1993: 484). Appearance matters is as specific as judges
have adjudicated.

10

Here is another definition: “Compactness is the generalization to topological spaces of the property
of closed and bounded subsets of the real line: the Heine-Borel Property. While compact may infer
"small" size, this is not true in general.”
http://www.msc.uky.edu/droyster/courses/fall99/math4181/classnotes/notes5.pdf (accessed March
25, 2015)
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One challenge associated with compactness is the spatial demographic that
Democrats tend to cluster more in cities while Republicans disperse more equally
throughout a state. That distribution favors Republicans in local and state races
(Chen and Rodden 2013; Cox 2006).
Many researchers have developed mathematically based optimization models for
designing districts (Ricca et al. 2013; Young 1988). These models are
mathematically defined, and researchers identify advantages and disadvantages of
each model (Young 1988; Pildes and Niemi 1993; Altman 1998, Pildes and Niemi
(1993: 553-557). They identify three general compactness quantitative measures:
dispersion (a circle is a perfect shape), perimeter (a district’s area compared to a
circle based on its perimeter), and population (comparing the population contained
within a polygon [“rubber-band” stretched tightly around the district] area with the
actual population. They conclude only the first two measures are appropriate for
implementing Shaw because population measures “do not measure "’shape’" in the
usual sense and therefore do not necessarily reflect the problems Shaw identifies”
(Pildes and Niemi 1993: 558).
There are numerous measures of compactness. The most common, the
Schwartzberg Measure (Polsby and Popper 1991: 347-350), was used in this thesis.
It compares the actual area of a district with the area created by making a circle
using the perimeter of a district. It is calculated as follows:
compactness = (district area* 4* π)/ (district perimeter)2
Figure 2 shows the compactness measures for the Democratic and Republican
districts between 1972 and 2014. During the 1970 census elections, the Republican

12

districts were slightly more compact than the Democratic ones. For the 1980 and
1990 census elections, the opposite was true. Since the Republican takeover in
2004, the Republican districts have been slightly more compact than the Democratic
districts. Using a standard Student T-Test, the only election in which the
compactness measures for the two parties was statistically different was the 2002
election, the last election dominated by the Democratic Party. The differences in
compactness scores between the two parties were not significant in the remaining
21 elections.
The map in Figure 14 shows the 2014 Texas Congressional districts by party. It
shows Democratic districts are convoluted (uncompact) districts in the Houston and
Dallas-Fort Worth urban areas, El Paso, and elongated districts running from south
Texas to Austin. As shown in Figure 2 below, these districts tend to be less compact
on average than the Republican districts.

Figure 2. Degree of Compactness by Party by Election 1972-2014.
When many people think of congressional redistricting, their first thought is of
gerrymandering – the construction of wildly shaped districts with long fingers
13

collecting snippets of population here and there. These districts typically have very
small compactness scores.
The maps below show extremes in Texas Congressional elections districts
between 1972 and 2014. Figure 3 shows the least compact district created in a
Texas Congressional race during this period. It was created by the Democratic Party
and was Democratic District 29 in Houston in 1992. It has a compactness score of
0.007. Figure 4 shows Republican congressional district 26. It includes Denton and
is north of Fort Worth. It is the most compact district in 2014 with a compactness
value of 0.46.

Figure 3. Least Compact Texas District.

D.

Figure 4. Most Compact Texas District.

Partisan and Non-partisan Redistricting Approaches

State legislatures in all the states have responsibility for redistricting. In order to
create more competitive races, twelve of the states, however, have given some
portion of that responsibility to commissions with non-legislative approaches (Cottrill
2012). Those outside groups in the states have various compositions and
independence. These approaches can be “partisan, bipartisan, and judicial.” (Masket
et al 2012: 40).
14

State redistricting authorities cannot always agree upon a plan. In those situations
redistricting does not occur after a census. If a state loses representation and no
new plan is approved, technically all representatives are elected at-large. However,
if the representatives remains the same or increases and no agreement can be
reached by the legislature and governor on reapportionment, then the existing
districting can be adopted and if there are additional representatives, there is an atlarge election. This default approach is called a reversionary plan and is rarely used
(Cox 2005: 18-19).
La Raja (2009: 214) classifies districting plans as Madisonian or Progressive in
nature. The Madisonian approach assumes self-interest permeates all parts of
politics, and redistricting plans must be developed to limit this self-interest to achieve
broader social goals. The Progressive approach, a legacy of late 20th century
politics, seeks “rules based on widely accepted norms and expert administration” to
guide new district creation. It prefers commission-type approaches to redistricting.
The normal spatial distribution of Democrats and Republicans in states can also
create what Chen and Rodden (2013: 239) describe as “Unintentional
Gerrymandering:”
[H]uman geography plays a far greater role in generating electoral bias in the
United States than commonly thought. Building on existing literature, we explore
the argument that Democrats are often more clustered in space than
Republicans as a result of the industrial revolution, great migration, and
subsequent patterns of suburbanization (241).
Republicans are frequently more evenly dispersed in states, including living in
outlying areas in small, rural communities and in suburbs or exurbs. Democrats tend
to live in more homogeneous neighborhoods than Republicans (Chen and Rodden
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(2013: 245). Democratic margins in urban districts, some of which are majorityminority districts, may be considered squandered to an extent because the
Democratic candidates are elected by wide margins – with votes that could swing
elections in adjacent districts. This subject is discussed further in the section on
partisan bias.
Similarly, Myers (2013: 56, 59), using a very small spatial unit of analysis, the
Voter Tabulation District (VTD), examines changes in polarization (between
progressive and conservative ideologies) in state-wide Texas elections between
1996 and 2010 and concludes the primary changes result from increased
partisanship in low populated areas in East and Central Texas favoring Republicans
and increased partisanship favoring Democrats in large urban areas. These changes
in voter attitudes more than overcame the influx of Hispanics during these years and
helped create the Republican revolution in Texas.

E.

Impact of Redistricting

By its very nature, it is evident redistricting can create uncertainly for incumbents
(McKee 2013; Fenno 1978). Simply stated, new constituents in a reconfigured
district may not be familiar with the new incumbent candidate, and the new
constituents are unknown to the candidate (Desposato and Petrocik 2005: 35) A
long history of community service and good-will generated by the incumbent may
have no meaning or value to his or her new constituents.
A bigger question, however, is do the efforts by commissions, the courts, and
others create more competitive elections? The research is inconclusive (La Raja
2009: 215). Some argue the “[i]mpact of partisan redistricting on partisan

16

redistricting and polarization are small, considerably more nuanced than reformers
would suggest, and overwhelmed by other aspects of the political environment.”
(Masket et al 2012, La Raja 2009). This environment includes events playing out on
the national scene, quality of the candidates at the top of the ticket, importance of
the election, and the consequent mood of the national electorate (Desposato and
Petrocik 2005: 35). Ongoing research by Carson et al, however, suggests
congressional districts designed by commissions and courts are more competitive
than those drawn by legislatures (Carson 2014: 166).
Incumbent representatives and the state political parties have different priorities
in redistricting. The objective of the first is to maximize his or her victory margin to
ensure re-election. The priority of the second is to maximize party controlled seats in
the state. Frequently, a compromise is agreed upon by the majority party and its
incumbents to accomplish both goals. Incumbents accept a reasonable victory
margin, and the party has votes to distribute elsewhere to achieve its goals (La Raja
2009; Desposato and Petrocik 2005).

17

F.

2013 and future redistricting trends.

Section 4 of the 1965 VRA requires certain states and other jurisdictions11
submit proposed redistricting plans and other voting law changes to the US Justice
Department prior to their implementation. They must get preapproval or
preclearance. This requirement was inserted because of a historic pattern of voter
discrimination and suppression in these states and municipalities.
In 2013, a 5-4 landmark decision by the US Supreme Court in Shelby County,
Alabama v. Holder, Attorney General overturned this key component in the VRA as
unconstitutional because it used 40-year-old data. Challenges to voting rules must
now be brought subsequent to their implementation (Liptak 2013).
Shortly after this decision, Texas introduced restrictive new voter regulations that
made voting more difficult. It sparked national attention when a female judge said
she was turned away at her polling location of many years because of different
middle names used in her identification documents (Boothroyd 2013).
The long term effects of lifting this half-century requirement to force greater
electoral equality will play out in upcoming elections this decade and following the
2020 census. Given the partisan nature of the current US legislature, it is unlikely
Section 4 of the 1965 VRA will become revived by congress. The option to pass a
new law was a somewhat cynical recommendation of the Supreme Court majority
who recognized that would not occur in the near future.
Another significant long trend will be the strong temptation for political parties
who take control of their state legislatures and governorships in mid-decade to
11

Nine states are impacted: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South
Carolina, Texas and Virginia. Other jurisdictions include numerous counties and political locations
such as Brooklyn, Manhattan and the Bronx (Liptak 2013).
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continue the mid-decade practice inspired by Texas after 2002, as a “mechanism
that party elites increasingly resort to in an effort to secure political advantage.”
(McKee: 2006: 317).

G.

Partisan Bias

Partisan bias is analysis that examines the relationship between the percentage
of votes received by a party in an election and percentage of seats the party wins. In
an ideal world the two percentages would be the same. In reality, parties in our nonparliamentarian, winner-take-all system attempt to maximize their percentage of
seats gained with a minimum percentage of votes. Commonly, the victorious party
receives less than 65% of the common votes, although the percentage seats won
may be much higher (Tufte 1973: 540).
The partias bias calculation uses linear regression with % seats won as the
dependent variable and % votes gained as the independent variable (Tufte 1973:
542). This relationship is shown as % Seats = α + β(% Votes) where α is the
constant and β is the slope of the equation or swing ratio (also called
responsiveness). The percentage of Seats increases by the swing ratio for each 1%
increase in percentage of votes garnered in the elections. The percentage of votes
required to win 50% of the seats is calculated, and the difference between that
number and 50% is the partisan bias or party advantage. For example, if 45% of the
votes is required to win 50% of the votes, the partisan bias is 50%- 45% = 5%.
Figure 5 shows the results of this analysis using the Texas congressional
electoral results examined in this study.

19

Figure 5. Regression Graph showing % Seats vs. % Votes in Texas US House
races 1972-2014.

The responsiveness shows that for every 1% increase in Democratic %VOTES
share, the %SEATS share increases by 1.67%. The party advantage or bias is about
4.5%. This means the Democrats would need to receive about 45 to 46 percent of
the votes to gain 50% of the congressional district seats. Partisan Bias research
typically compares elections in many locations over many years.
While this analysis (Figure 5) is consistent with earlier research in partisan bias
(Tufte 1973), this thesis analyzes %SEATS and %VOTES in a different way.
Partisan Bias is a single number and is calculated using a series of elections (as
shown in Figure 5). In this paper, the relation between %SEATS and %VOTES is
calculated for each election, for example all the districts in the 1972 or in the 1974
elections.
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Figure 5 also shows the susceptibility of the classic Partisan Bias metric to the
time period one chooses to analyze. Figure 5 suggests the Democratic Party has
had an advantage in Texas during the years covered in the research, which has not
been the situation since 2004.

H.

Texas Redistricting

The literature of Texas redistricting following the 2000 and 2010 censuses
describes two major threads: first, how the Republicans dramatically increased their
representation in the Texas US House caucus following their historic second
redistricting after gaining control of the Texas legislature and governorship in the
2002 elections and, second, the factors that help them maintain this dominance.
While several researchers have written on these events, there is a significant gap in
understanding them from a geographical perspective (Myers 2013; Bickerstaff 2007;
Cox 2004; Katz 2006).
This literature describes the transition in Texas that had previously occurred in
the Southeastern states as part of the successful Republican strategy to wrest those
states from traditional Democratic dominance. This shift, carefully examined using
many theoretical prisms, occurred between the 1960s and the 1990s as the result of
significant economic and social shifts in the old south (Myers 2013: 48). Myers
(2013: 49) quotes Shafer and Johnston’s finding that “by the late 1990s ‘a new
Southern political order’ had emerged.”
This tumultuous period (1950s to 1990s) was a time of political awakening and
empowerment for southern African-Americans (Hutchings and Valentino 2004: 387).
Decisions made in Washington dramatically disrupted the traditional southern
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economic, racial, and social system. It was also a great awakening for southern
Whites of all economic and social classes and religions. The political pendulum
swung in one direction for the Democrats and in another for the Republicans.
Socially conservative, religious White southern Dixiecrats of varying means became
Republicans and currently serve as the bulwark of the dominant conservative branch
of the contemporary Republican Party (Shafer and Johnston 2006; Kousser 2010;
Toobin 2003). At the same time southern black Democrats elected black
representatives to the U.S. House in record numbers as a result of many majorityminority districts, but their creation actually has helped promote a greater
Republican majority in these states (Cameron 1996; Toobin 2003).
The Texas redistricting literature describes the many court findings that nudged
the process and hindered or enabled some specific plans. It describes the political
processes involved in gerrymandering congressional districts to the advantage of the
majority party - and how that party can protect its dominance even following future
decadal censuses during which the traditionally Democratic Hispanic population is
expect to continue to increase (see Bickerstaff 2007; Katz 2006; McKee et al 2006).
As Bickerstaff (2006: 1) put it: “The redrawing of congressional district lines in
Texas in 2003 was one of the most extraordinary political events in the past fifty
years, the culmination of a three-year effort to increase the Republican majority in
the United States House of Representatives. The significance of the outcome lay not
only in its effect on the relative strength of political parties in Texas or in the U.S.
Congress, but also in the precedent it set for political and redistricting trends
nationwide.”
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Key to this story is the remarkable growth in Texas population in the past several
decades. The state gained three congressional seats following the 1990 census, an
additional two seats after the 2000 census, and four more seats following the 2010
census for its current thirty-six US House seats. This dramatic growth has fueled
substantial redistricting and provided opportunity for political intrigue and
gamesmanship (Sauter 2012; Texas election website; McKee et al 2006).
1.

Gaming the system: the Republican takeover

As with many states, the redistricting process in Texas has been contentious for
many election cycles. Democrats dominated Texas politics for decades and had
controlled the Texas House since Reconstruction (Bickerstaff 2006: 15).
Republicans were accustomed to challenging their redistricting plans – and losing in
the courts (Bickerstaff 2006: 315). By the 1980s, however, political fortunes in Texas
were changing. The Republicans were steadily gaining strength in US congressional
elections. On the state level, “[n]o Democrat has won a statewide election in Texas
since 1994” (Bickerstaff 2006: 20)
Tom Delay, the ambitious majority leader in the Republican dominated US
House, was the pivotal figure in this 2000-2004 period. His explicit goal - “I’m the
majority leader and we want more seats”– was to gain control of both Texas Houses
and increase the number of Republican US House members (numerous sources
including Bickerstaff 2006; McKee et al 2006).
Following a successful state election cycle in 2002, Delay had the perfect storm:
Republicans controlled both houses in the Texas Legislature, the governorship, and
had a Texas Republican in the White House with control of the US Department of
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Justice. He could now re-redistrict Texas for a controversial second time within the
same decade to accomplish his goal. The US Constitution specifies only that the
process be completed following a decennial census. It does not specify that it can be
done only once (See Cox 2006 for a full discussion of this issue.).
As is common in early stages of the redistricting process, Texas Republicans
developed five different redistricting plans, all of which were vigorously contested in
court by the Democrats and organizations such as League of United Latin American
Citizens (LULAC) (Katz 2006: 38). The final redistricting plan was developed by a
small group of Delay’s associates (a “political cabal”) and dramatically altered many
Texas districts (Bickerstaff 2006: 236).
The Supreme Court in LULAC v. Perry in 2006 upheld much of the proposed
redistricting but raised an important point that continues to fester in congressional
redistricting. The court ruled unconstitutional the redistricting of a south Texas
district that had placed a hundred thousand Hispanics in a new district. It also ruled
constitutional dismantling a Fort Worth district in which a minority African American
population had ensured reelection of an incumbent (Katz 2006: 38).
2.

Re-redistricting prior to the 2004 elections

Understanding what occurred in the 2003 re-redistricting process is critical to
understanding the Republican revolution that turned Texas from a purple state into a
strongly red state. Texas Democrats recognized their fortunes were fading after the
1990 census. Their redistricting plan in that period was drawn artfully to ensure their
majority status in the US congressional delegation during the 1990s. The plan
ultimately was struck down in Bush v. Vera (1996) in which the Supreme Court
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rejected the proposed Democratic plan because it was too closely based on racial
factors (Sauter 2012: 272).
Following the 2000 elections, Republicans held a slim majority in the Texas
Senate, and Democrats had a slim majority in the House. With a split legislature, the
parties could not agree on a redistricting plan, and a U.S. District Court imposed a
plan changing little while protecting incumbents of both parties. The three-judge
court ruled conservatively and maintained much of the 1990 districting as the courtordered map. In the 2002 congressional elections Democrats maintained a 17 to 15
majority in US House seats, although the Republicans had a 59% to 40% vote
majority in statewide congressional elections (Sauter 2012: 273).
Tom Delay’s efforts were hugely successful in changing this imbalance between
votes and electoral seats in the 2004 US Congressional races in Texas. Republican
representation grew from 15 in 2002 to 21 seats in 2004, while the Democrats
shrank from 17 to 11 seats – a swing of 12 seats.
Redistricting is generally an evolutionary process where boundaries are tweaked
and old districts are modified based on criteria, established regulations, and,
frequently, by the courts (See Webster 2013 for a review of current redistricting
criteria.). The new boundaries drawn for the 2004 Texas Congressional elections,
however, were a dramatic departure from those approved by the court for the 2002
elections with the results noted above. Minorities were packed into ten of thirty-two
districts, while Republican voters were spread evenly (64-68%) throughout the
remaining districts. Almost 10 million people were moved into new districts
(Bickerstaff 2006: 272, 254).
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High drama surrounded this second redistricting. The Democrats state legislators
twice fled the state in fall 2003 – once to Oklahoma and once to New Mexico – to
deprive the Republicans of a quorum for approving the plan (Cox 2004: 752).
Republican governor Rick Perry ultimately called two special sessions, and when
finally there was a quorum, the dominant Republicans voted to approve the
controversial plan (Forest 2004: 447). He signed it into law on October 13, 2003.
The final piece was in place when the US Department of Justice approved the plan.
The Democrats promptly challenged the proposed plan in a federal district court
(Session v. Perry). In a 2-1 decision, the court approved the plan with the Texas
State Attorney arguing “the legislature had a right in its discretion to choose how
best to recognize the voting strength of minority populations within Texas and had
no obligation to maximize such voting strength.” (Bickerstaff 2006: 260).
The Republican majority gained three seats in the US House following the 2004
elections. Only seven House incumbents running for office across the country were
defeated in that election. Four of those incumbents were from Texas (Jacobson
2005: 199). Republican US House gains from Texas were six seats. Delay had
achieved his goal of increasing the Republican majority in the US House of
Representatives by re-redistricting his home state.
3.

Packing, Cracking, and Fracking.

As noted above, Delay was aggressive in his approach to re-redistricting the
state prior to the 2004 US House elections. Packing your opponents into one district
is a common tactic to remove them from adjacent districts and make those districts
safe for your party. The opposition party wins the packed districts by high tallies, but
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any votes above 50% plus 1 are effectively lost. Bickerstaff (2006: 272), for example,
lists 10 congressional districts in which the minority population (Hispanics and
African Americans) averaged 74.6% of the district voting age population.
Cracking, on the other hand, moves a limited number of opposition party voters
into a district strongly controlled by the majority party. The dominant party wins the
district with a smaller majority, but the opposition party isn’t in a position to influence
adjacent districts election outcomes.
The unique term is fracking. I use the term to describe Delay’s unusual tactic of
attacking incumbents in both parties. Typically, there is an informal understanding
that incumbents in both parties are protected during redistricting (Webster 2013:3).
That practice was not Delay’s intent in 2003.
Steve Bickerstaff’s book (2006) describes Delay’s tactics for creating a
Republican majority in the Texas US House delegation in 2004. After strongly
funding the successful Republican take-over of the Texas House in the 2002 general
election, Republicans now controlled both Texas congressional bodies and the
governorship. There were no Democrats in position to oppose him. Delay’s
approach involved selecting the “right” Republicans and targeting Anglo Democratic
congressmen (they were all male). Texans for a Republican Majority (TRMPAC) was
the major vehicle Delay used for fund raising – with the support of several other
major commercial trade groups. In addition, the “right” Republicans were required to
support Tom Craddick, a Midland, Texas legislator, for Speaker of the Texas House
(Bickerstaff 2006: 51). “TRMPAC played a significant role in determining who would
be the Republican candidate for the general election by endorsing specific
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candidates, contributing money to them during the Republican primary, and
orchestrating intense direct- mail campaigns when needed” (Bickerstaff 2006: 51).
With the “right” Republicans in the race, Delay turned to defeating Democratic
incumbents. The 10 Democratic incumbents fell generally into 2 groups: 6 were
incumbents in strongly Republican districts and 4 Democrats represented
Republican-minority districts.
Delay’s tacticians developed different tactics for each group. Adding additional
Republicans in Republican dominant districts was not feasible. Hence, the shape of
these districts was changed to force the Democratic incumbents to run in
Republican-majority districts that included significantly new geographies.
Republicans in these areas were not familiar with the Democratic representatives –
and felt little loyalty to them. Some of the Democrats were in rural districts. Their
core constituents were divided among several congressional districts. Of the six
Democrats in Republican dominated districts, two were defeated, one did not run for
reelection, one changed party (to Republican), and two were reelected - a gain of
four Republican seats (Bickerstaff 2006:102-103).
Republicans had other plans for the 4 Democratic Anglo incumbents in
Republican-minority districts. One district was a protected (by the Voting Rights Act)
majority-minority district. The Republicans selected and tried – unsuccessfully – to
elect a Hispanic Republican from this district. Two of the districts were cracked and
packed. Large numbers of Black and Hispanic voters were either moved into
dominate Republican districts (cracked) or packed into heavily minority districts. The
fourth Anglo incumbent was moved from a strongly Democratic Anglo district into a
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320 mile long district stretching from Austin to Hidalgo County in south Texas. It
became designated a majority-minority district. Two of the four Democrats were
defeated; two won reelection in reconfigured districts. A gain of two Republican
seats (Bickerstaff 2006: 104-105).
Another Republican goal was to strengthen the position of suburban Republicans
who were more committed to the party than Republicans in rural areas. Blending
rural and suburban Republicans into a single district would ensure increased power
for the suburbanites. A side effect of this strategy was the decreased compactness
of these districts. “[V]ery few districts ended up being compact. Compactness was
sacrificed to achieve certain interparty and intraparty goals.” (Bickerstaff 2006: 106).
Delay’s re-redistricting tactics are a text-book example of redistricting for the
maximum advantage of the dominant party.
4.

2010 Census

Ten years later, the 2010 census confirmed Texas had continued to grow rapidly.
Its population increased over 20 percent to 25.1 million people, and was now the
second most populous state behind only California. Hispanics were 37 percent of the
state population and represented 65 percent of the state population growth after the
2000 census (Sauter 2012: 253).
Republican electoral success in top Texas elections continued as a the result of
more than just redistricting machinations. Myers (2013: 48) describes this process
as “secular geographical polarization.” It occurred over time (secular); and is
“‘geographical’ because it is most clearly demarcated across space, and it amounts
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to ‘polarization’ because different geographies are increasingly headed in opposite
directions.”
“Republicans have made dramatic gains in rural and exurban parts of Texas,
many of which had only become marginally republican by the mid-1990s. At the
same time, while the most urban parts of the state were staunchly Democratic in the
mid-1990s, they have only become more so since then” (Myers 2013: 50).
Stephanopoulos (2012: 1904) identifies the trend of “spatial diversity,” which he
defines as change in a specific variable across geographic space. As communities
became more similar to each other, there was little diversity within the specific
communities but significant diversity between them. Rural communities were similar
to other rural communities; exurban communities were similar to each other; as were
urban communities. The social, economic, and political diversity, however, between
the types of communities was significant. In his analysis, Myers (2013: 53) found
many of the lightly populated districts in eastern and east central Texas were
Republican hot areas of support. In those areas, many of the traditional Democrats
had switched parties.
5.

2012 Districts

This dramatic population growth provided the state an additional four seats in
the US House and raised its total to 36. This growth ensured another round of
Republican dominated redistricting plans, since its dominance in state government
continued. With the significant increase in the Hispanic population, many groups
anticipated that most of the new seats would become majority-minority districts with
Hispanic representatives. In fact, only one of the four seats was configured as a
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Hispanic majority-minority district. In spite of broad Hispanic population growth
across the South, Texas was only one of two states (Florida the other) to develop a
new Hispanic majority-minority congressional district (Peralta and Larkin 2011: 552).
The complaint registered by the Hispanic interest groups mentioned earlier was that
the proposed new district plans diluted minority groups voting strength, which is a
violation of Section 2 of the VRA (Sauter 2012: 275).
This story “… of Texas redistricting litigation illustrates two outstanding questions in
voting-rights jurisprudence: First, how should the mandates of the VRA be reconciled with
the question of who "counts" in congressional representation? And second, just how much
minority representation constitutes effective representation under § 2? The court's current
practice of analyzing VRA compliance on a case-by-case basis will become untenable in the
long run. Redistricting law needs a manageable standard by which to determine whether
states are effectively representing minorities in congressional redistricting plans” (Sauter

2012: 257).
Many of the same techniques (cracking and packing) used by White Democrats
in the late 1900s to disenfranchise black minorities are now being employed by
Texas Republicans to protect their new electoral strength following the 2000 census
and future censuses (McKee and Shaw 2005: 277). With traditional patterns of
Democratic Hispanic voters continuing to move into and live in urban areas, the
Republicans are well positioned to continue their dominance in Texas state and
national government and politics following future censuses (Bickerstaff 2006; McKee
and Shaw 2005; and Myers 2013).
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IV. Methodology and Data
A.

Methodology

To assess the impact that district compactness and major demographic changes
between 1972 and 2014 had on the outcome of Texas congressional elections,
general linear model (GLM) regression was used to assess the relationship between
distortion (the dependent variable) and the independent variables: district
compactness, the demographic variables, and a dummy variable identifying the
party controlling redistricting. Univariate GLM was used because there was only one
dependent variable and one of the independent variables was a categorical dummy
variable, which made simple linear regression inappropriate.
The general equation for the model was:
Dependent Variable = α + β(Var1) + µ(Var2) + ν(Var3) + ρ(Var4) + σ(Var5) + 𝜀𝑖
where α is the intercept value, β, µ, ν, ρ, and σ are coefficients for each independent
variable, and 𝜀𝑖 is the error term.
The expectation of this analysis was that the compactness variable would be
significant and could be considered a proxy that reflected the strategies used by
both parties during their years of controlling the redistricting process. The large
demographics changes in Texas during the study period would also be expected to
significantly shape the election results.
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B.

Data

The data for this thesis was derived from the accumulation of election results for
each congressional district race in each election cycle12. Thus, for the 1970 census
elections (1972 – 1980), the raw data included the results of each of the 24 district
races. For the 2014 election, the data was derived from each of the 36
congressional district races. Between 1972 and 2014 there were 637 congressional
district races in Texas. Given the nature of the dependent variable, distortion, the
results for the individual districts races were combined into collective results for each
of the election cycles. There were 22 congressional elections between 1972 and
2014, and each represents one of the 22 cases in the model. Thus, the sample size
(n) is 22. All elections were won by a Democrat or Republican.
1.

Dependent Variable - distortion

The dependent variable is distortion. It uses the same factors as Partisan Bias
(party advantage), except it is calculated for each congressional election cycle (see
previous partisan bias discussion). For each of the 22 election cycles distortion is
the aggregate difference between the percentage of seats won by the Democratic
Party and the percentage of votes the Democratic Party received. Mathematically, it
shown as: Distortion = 100*(%SEATS - %VOTES). Cumulative distortion is zero,
and the distortion values of each party are complementary. Thus, if distortion for the
Democratic Party in one election cycle is +6, it is -6 for the Republican Party. The
%SEATS number is straight-forward. The %VOTES calculation, however, includes
only the combined votes received by the Republican and Democratic parties in each
12

Cycles refer to each election year. The congressional district elections in 1972, for example,
represent one cycle.
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district race. If other parties received 4% of the vote, for example, the total vote for
the two major parties is 96%. The %VOTES for the Democratic Party is the
percentage of votes it received of the combined Democratic and Republican party
total. Thus, if the Democratic Party received 65% of the votes in a district race and
the Republican Party received 31%, the %VOTES = 0.65/(0.65 + 0.31) = 68%.
%VOTES is combined from each district race to calculate an average %VOTES in
for election cycle. Election results were taken from The Almanac of American Politics
published each two years. Official U.S. House election results with candidates,
parties, and vote tallies are also available in Election Results at
http://history.house.gov/Institution/Election-Statistics/Election-Statistics/ (accessed
January 3, 2015). Texas US House election details for 2014 were found at
http://www.usatoday.com/pages/interactives/elections-results-2014/#house-tx
(accessed January 3, 2015).
Figure 6 shows the combined Democratic and Republican percentage votes and
percentage seats during the 1972–2014 periods. Visually, several trends are clear:
The percentage of seats won by the Democrats clearly declines during the study
period (as those of the Republicans increase). The same trend is true for the
percentage of votes won by the Democrats and Republicans.
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Figure 6. Texas US House Seat Elections 1972-2014: Percentage Seats and Votes.

Figure 7 summarizes the distortion results based on the difference between the
Democratic and Republican % Seats and % Votes seen in Figure 6.

Figure 7. Distortion in Texas US House Elections between 1972 and 2014.
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Figure 7 shows that during the periods (1972-2002) the Democratic Party had
positive distortion values. Once the Republicans took control after re-redistricting in
2003, they have gained positive distortion scores. The decline in the positive
distortion scores for the Democrats beginning in the late 1990s foreshadowed the
power shift that occurred early in the next decade.
Another examination of Figure 7 shows the relative performance of the elections
that showed responsiveness and partisan bias. The average Democratic distortion in
the elections it controlled redistricting was +15%. In the six elections controlled by
the Republicans, Democratic average distortion was -6%.
Figure 8 is Figure 5 (the Partisan Bias chart) that highlights declining fortunes of
the Texas Democratic Party congressional election results between 1972 and 2014.

Figure 8. Democratic % Seats vs. % Votes in Texas US House Races 1972-2014.
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2.

Independent Variables

There are five independent variables in the model. The first independent variable
is the average district compactness13 of each election cycle. There are three
demographic variables - percent urban population (verses rural), percent nonHispanic Whites, and percent Hispanics. These represent dominant demographic
changes in the state during the study period as measured in each election cycle.
The fifth variable is a dummy variable indicating whether the Democratic Party or the
Republican Party effectively controlled the redistricting process. Figure 9 shows the
changes for each variable.

Variable

Type

Min

Max

Standard
Deviation

Source

Compactness
(average)

Continuous

0.1

0.274

0.0417

% Urban

Continuous

72.8

84.8

3.8

44

87

15.6

15.4

38.8

7.9

0

1

Calculated. Area and
perimeter data at
ftp://ftpgis1.tlc.state.tx.us/t
emp/
Almanac. Taken from
Census Bureau data.
Almanac. Taken from
Census Bureau data. Only
non-Hispanic Whites.
Almanac. Taken from
Census Bureau data.
Party controlling
redistricting
0 = Republican Party
1 = Democratic Party

Range: (0-1)

Range: (0-100)

% NonContinuous
Range: (0-100)
Hispanic
White
% Hispanic Continuous
Range: (0-100)

Dominant
Party

Categorical
Range: (0-1)

Figure 9. Independent Variable Properties.

13

Again, the Schwartzberg Measure, which divides district area by a circle based on the district
perimeter, was used in this thesis. Both area and perimeter values are included in the Texas
Legislative Council files at ftp://ftpgis1.tlc.state.tx.us/temp/.
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Compactness
Compactness measures reflect the strategy of the dominant party in charge of
redistricting. The Schwartzberg compactness measurement was used. See the
compactness literature review for a fuller description of this variable.
The literature review on compactness describes why measuring compactness is
important. First, redistricting includes and excludes certain populations. That is,
districts comprise both physical boundaries and population distributions. Districts
with low compactness values are often carved out to create majority-minority
districts (resulting in the election of Black or Hispanic US House representatives).
While these districts may be federally protected, they tend to aggregate opposition
voters together into a single district. Compactness can measure how opposition
voters are more generally packed together or separated (cracked) into spaces
controlled by the dominant party. Second, compactness is a proxy for how districts
are shaped to create safe districts for the dominant party and marginal districts
(winner receives 60% or less of the total votes) for the opposition. Compactness
values reflect the strategy of the party controlling the redistricting process.
As highlighted previously in the discussion preceding Figure 2, a Student T-Test
run on Republican and Democratic compactness values in each of the 22 elections
between 1972 and 2014 showed no significant differences in the compactness
scores between the two parties, except for one election. In the 2002 election, the
average compactness for the 17 Democratic districts was 20.4% and for the 15
Republican districts 28.5%, significant at p = 0.05.
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Demographic Variables
Figure 10 shows the change over time in the three Texas demographic variables.

Figure 10. Selected Texas District Demographics 1072-2014.
Two demographics shown in Figure 10 are particularly important. First, the
percentage of non-Hispanic Whites has declined to less than 50 percent of the total
population since the 1990s. With the addition of Blacks and other minorities, Texas
is now a White-minority in total population. The white population segment has not
grown nearly as fast as the Hispanic/Latino segment.
Hispanics
The Hispanic/Latino population has grown to almost 40 percent of the total
population. The Hispanic/Latino growth, however, is somewhat deceptive. The
percentages represent census numbers, which counts everybody including
undocumented Hispanics who are ineligible to vote in elections plus underage
individuals. Over the years, the percentage of Hispanics eligible to vote is
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approximately 1-3% fewer than their numbers, and provides non-Hispanic eligible
voters (primarily non-Hispanic Whites) an equally positive bump in their Voting Age
Population (VAP) numbers in relative terms.14 In 1980, there were 3 million Texas
Hispanics and 0.6 million Hispanic voters. In 2012, the Hispanic population
increased to 10 million with 1.9 million voters, an almost equal percentage. Almost
sixty-nine percent of the Texas Hispanic population is considered part of the VAP,
while seventy-three percent of the non-Hispanic population is considered in the VAP
(Stanley 2010 conference presentation).
As Campoy and Tamman describe in their Wall Street Journal article (2011),
Hispanics represented 65% of the population growth in the 2010 census. Hispanics,
based on this growth, expected to gain 3 of the 4 new congressional seats awarded
Texas following that census. In reality, they gained one Hispanic majority-minority
seat. And, as reported by Kevin Diaz in the Houston Chronicle (2014), the fight for
Hispanic votes in Texas is becoming more competitive. Hispanics still primarily vote
for Democrats, but in diminishing percentages. Harold Stanley in his 2010
conference paper reported in the 2008 presidential election Hispanics split their vote
70% for Democrats and 30% for Republicans while Blacks voted 90% for
Democrats; and Non-Hispanics voted 70% Republican (Stanley 2010: 10).
Urban Population
The census now, as noted previously, includes the suburbs as urban in its
urban/rural split. The Texas population is becoming increasingly urban as those
living in rural environments represent as decreasing demographic. With the

14

See district election results, for example, at
ftp://ftpgis1.tlc.state.tx.us/temp/2012G_H309_pop_and_election/
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Republican tactic of removing the suburban space from the central city core
described previously, this urban space, as defined by the census, is no longer
primarily a Democratic domain.
Non-Hispanic Whites
While the percentage of non-Hispanic Whites declined over the decades, the
character of the remaining Whites also changed. The traditional Democratic base of
small farmers were displaced and replaced by suburbanites moving into Texas who
responded to the Republican message of lower taxes, smaller government, and
strong family values (Micklethwait and Wooldridge 2004: 32).
The 2010 Census confirms Texas is now a White-minority state. Non-Hispanic
Whites, as noted in the 2012 Almanac of American Politics (1518), represent 45.3%
of the Texas population; Blacks15 11.5%; and non-White Hispanics 37.6%. Figure 10
above shows the declining percentages of non-Hispanic Whites over the recent
decades.

V. Results and Discussion
Results of the General Linear Regression Model show the Dominant Party
variable and Compactness variable were significant, while the large demographic
changes occurring during the 1972 – 2014 period were not.
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%Blacks is not included as a variable in the model. While the absolute number of Blacks in Texas
has increased, their relative percentage of the total Texas population has declined slightly from
12.5% in 1970 to 11.6% in 1990 and 11.5% in 2010 as the percentage of other populations
increased more rapidly. They are a vital voting bloc for the Democratic Party, but their relative
numbers have not significantly changed since the 1970s.
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The R2 for the model is high at 0.808 with an adjusted R2 of 0.748, indicating the
model explains a large proportion of the variance in the dependent (distortion)
variable. The full results of the General Linear Model are shown in Figure 11.

Dependent Variable: Democratic Distortion
95% Confidence Interval
Parameter

B

Std. Error

t

Sig.

Lower Bound

Upper Bound

Intercept

-30.202

87.509

-.345

.734

-215.713

155.308

[DominantParty=Rep]

-14.648

5.212

-2.811

.013

-25.696

-3.599

a

.

.

.

.

.

-111.629

61.015

-1.830

.086

-240.975

17.716

Urban

.332

.718

.462

.650

-1.191

1.854

White

.549

.448

1.226

.238

-.400

1.498

[DominantParty=Dem]
AveCmptns

0

HispanicLatino
.148
.698
.212
.835
-1.332
1.628
a
Notes: 1) This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant. 2) R Squared = .808 (Adjusted R Squared = .748)

Figure 11. General Linear Model Results.
Two variables are significant in the model. The categorical dummy variable,
Dominant Party (Republican or Democratic) is significant at the p = 0.05 level. This
finding is not surprising since the dominant party creates the districts during
redistricting. Even as the Democratic party in the 1980s and 1990s were losing voter
support (as the Republican Party was growing stronger), the Democratic Party was
still able to dominate the Texas US House delegation. Appendix A examines how
successful the parties are in their efforts to craft Texas congressional districts to their
advantage during the 5 elections following each new census.
The second significant variable is average compactness (p = 0.1). The
coefficient is negative, indicating the dependent variable (Democratic distortion) is
inversely correlated with compactness. As compactness increases, Democratic
distortion values decrease. That is, the difference between %SEATS and %VOTES
decreases. As compactness increases, the elections become less efficient in the
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sense that the difference between %SEATS and %VOTES becomes smaller and
more votes are required to generate the percentage of seat won. The Partisan Bias
score (the percentage of votes required to gain 50% of the congressional seats) for
the Democrats is smaller (a large Partisan Bias is desirable); more votes are
required to win 50% of the seats in the elections. The Partisan Bias results for this
data are shown in Figure 5.
Since 2004, the Republican Party has dominated redistricting. The model
findings indicate that increasing compactness reduces bias (Democratic distortion)
and suggests compactness matters not just in terms of appearance, but also in
electoral results. This analysis can be revisited in coming years to confirm the
Republican trend.
None of the demographic variables (%Urban population, %non-Hispanic Whites,
and %Hispanic/Latino) are significant. Even with the apparent decline in some of the
Republican base (the non-Hispanic White population) and the large increase in the
Hispanic population, either of these demographic variables was significant.
Solutions to the model are shown below. Eq 1 is the general solution. Eq2 and 2a
are the solutions when the Dominant Party variable = Republican (1). Eq 3 and 3a
are solutions when the Dominant Party variable = Democratic (0). In equations 2a
and 3a the numeric values have been combined.
Eq 1 DemDistortion = α + β(DominantParty) + µ(AveCmptns) + ν(Urban) +
ρ(White) + σ(HispanicLatino) + 𝜀𝑖
Eq 2 DemDistortion (1 = Rep) = −30.202 + −14.648(1) -111.629 (AveCmptns) +
.332 (Urban) + .549 (White) + .148 (HispanicLatino) + εi =
Eq 2a DemDistortion (1 = Rep)= -44.850 -111.629 (AveCmptns) + .332 (Urban) +
.549 (White) + .148 (HispanicLatino) + εi
Eq 3 DemDistortion (0 = Dem) = −30.202 + −14.648(0) - 111.629 (AveCmptns) +
.332 (Urban) + .549 (White) + .148 (HispanicLatino) + εi =
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Eq 3a DemDistortion (1 = Rep)= -30.202 - 111.629 (AveCmptns) + .332 (Urban) +
.549 (White) + .148 (HispanicLatino) + εi
Since none of the %Urban, %White, and %Hispanic/Latino demographic
variables are significant, the regression lines for the model can be shown in Figure
12 with Democratic distortion as the dependent variable and average compactness
as the independent variable.

Figure 12. Graphic Display of Distortion vs. Average Compactness in General Linear
Model Results.
The inverse relationship with Democratic Distortion and Average compactness is
visible. As average compactness increases, Democratic distortion decreases – the
differential between %SEATS and %VOTES decreases.
Absolute Distortion
Using absolute values for distortion provides another useful approach to examine
the data. This inspection is important because it answers the question of whether or
not the results of the original model are dependent or independent of the Dominant
Party dummy variable. The model results are shown in Figure 13. It shows several
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important findings. First, the R2 and adjusted R2 values suggest this model explains
much less of the variance in the dependent variable. Second, the previously
significant variables, Dominant Party and Average Compactness, are not significant.
Third, the three demographic variables remain insignificant. These results
strengthen the argument that the variance in the Distortion variable is party
dependent. The model using absolute distortion values is not useful for
understanding distortion variance but does answer an important question.

Figure 13: Model Using Absolute Distortion Values as the dependent variable

VI. Conclusions
This thesis introduces a variable called distortion that examines the same factors
(%SEATS and %VOTES) studied in the earlier Partisan Bias research. Rather than
regressing percentage seats won against percentage votes garnered, the variable is
a simple subtraction of percentage votes from percentage seats. While it is
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mathematically possible for a party to have a positive distortion score while winning
less than 50% of the electoral votes, that did not occur in any of the 22 elections
analyzed in Texas between 1972 and 2014. Further research is warranted in an
examination of how often and under what circumstances that situation occurs.
The model showed two independent variables were significant in explaining the
variance in the distortion dependent variable: the dummy dominant party variable
and the compactness variable. Finding the dominant party variable significant
suggests the party that controlled redistricting was able to create a positive distortion
score that, in this study, resulted in winning more than 50% of the Texas
Congressional seats in the election cycles they controlled. Between 1972 and 2002,
that occurred for the Democrats even as the Republicans were gaining voting
strength and the Democrats losing strength.
The second significant variable was average compactness. The policy
implications of the finding of an inverse correlation between Democratic distortion
and average compactness and a positive correlation of Republican correlation and
average compactness can be important for the party in control of redistricting. If the
Republican Party maintains control of the Texas Legislature and governor’s office in
the 2020 election, the findings suggest, based on only six election cycles, that it
would do better creating more compact districts given electoral constraints.16 Future
results will confirm this hypothesis.
The full implications of the significance of the compactness variable are
somewhat murky and are yet to be fully understood. The findings suggest the

16

These include maintenance of majority-minority districts for both predominately Black areas and for
predominately Hispanic areas in South Texas.
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Republicans in the 6 election cycles they had dominated since 2003 have configured
Texas congressional districts to their advantage using increased compactness to
create greater positive distortion in their favor.
A partial answer may be provided by Bill Bishop in his Big Sort analysis. He
compares the 1976 and 2004 Presidential election results by county and finds likeminded people are increasingly congregating together. He writes “In 1976, less than
a quarter of Americans lived in places where the presidential election was a
landslide [one presidential candidate wins by a margin of 20%]. By 2004, nearly
half of all voters lived in landslide counties” (Bishop 2008: 6). Republican leaders in
Texas, intentionally or not, can accomplish their political goals by creating more
compact districts packing together like-minded peoples – either Democrats or
Republicans.17
This finding of increasing compactness in districts created by the dominant party
(in this case the Republicans as they gained a majority of the Texas US
congressional delegation in 2004) suggests the need for additional research to
determine if this Texas trend is also present in other states in the recent redistricting
cycles. If the trend identified by Bishop in his book has continued – the self-sorting of
like-minded people into their own spaces, it is very possible congressional districts,
as a whole, will become more compact. The controlling party may, in fact,
increasingly keep various political sub-divisions together (discussed in section III C)
as they shape (packing and cracking) electoral districts to their advantage.

17

These more compact districts may not include black or Hispanic majority districts, which may
remain highly convoluted to create the majority-minority districts required by the VRA and the courts.

47

The non-significance of the demographic variables is also an important finding.
Even as the state population has grown, the non-Hispanic White percentage has
declined, and the Hispanic population percentage has increased; these variables
have not been shown to significantly impact distortion. Other demographic factors
not captured in the gross demographics used in this study are in play and may
support the Republican Party gains beginning the 1990s (see, for example, footnote
18).
The Republican Party is currently (2015) in a very strong electoral position in the
state – controlling both houses of the Texas legislature, the governor’s office, and all
the seats on the state Supreme Court. This situation will likely ensure continued
dominance during the remainder of the current 2010 census elections through 2020.
And, unless the Democrats can win one of the state houses in the 2020 election, the
Republican Party will control redistricting following the 2020 census. While the
demographic trends are seemly against the Republicans, it is likely the Republicans
will continue to allocate (with federal prompting) a number of majority-minority
districts to the Democratic Party and redistrict the remaining congressional seats to
Republican advantage.
Support of the Hispanic populations will be a critical factor for both parties. As
noted earlier, the Democrats enjoy about 70% support from this ethnic group. If the
Republicans can increase their support among Hispanics, however, Republican
domination of state politics will continue indefinitely. A conservative 18 White-Hispanic
coalition in Texas could help ensure Republican domination for decades. Figure 14
18

In 2010, about 6.5 million Texans out of a total population of 25 million were Evangelical
Protestants (http://texasalmanac.com/topics/religion accessed April 24, 2015), many whom tend to be
conservative voters (Micklethwait and Wooldridge 2004).
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below shows, the Democratic districts are concentrated either in largely-black areas
in the major metropolitan areas or in largely Hispanic areas in south Texas and El
Paso. In south Texas and the urban areas, the districts have low compactness
scores. The south Texas districts are very long and run up into the Austin area –
running hundreds of miles in length.

Figure 14: Democratic and Republican Congressional Districts in 2014
This finding is shown in the compactness numbers in Figure 7. The Republican
Party redistricting results in more compact Republican districts and less compact
Democratic districts. This makes sense from a Republican perspective, as many of
the Democratic districts are majority-minority districts where fingers of minority
populations are joined in very non-compact districts similar to that shown in Figure 3.
These majority-minority districts also allow the Republican Party to increase partisan
bias (party advantage) for their districts, while still providing their incumbent and new
candidates a safe margin of victory.
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The final topic in this thesis is the question of how generalizable is this
methodology? Is the distortion variable a useful method for analyzing congressional
districts, state legislative districts, and local elections? Is the direct correlation
between positive distortion and the dominant party’s redistricting since 2000 unique
to this study, or is it common in elections across the country? In this study the party
with the largest number of congressional representatives always had a positive
distortion value. How often will an opposition party have a positive distortion – a
higher percentage of seats than percentage of votes? How likely, for example, will
an opposition party gain 35% of the seats with 30% of the votes in our winner-takeall electoral system?
If Partisan Bias (discussed in section III G) is, in a sense, the second derivative
of %SEATS and %VOTES analysis, then, the distortion variable (%SEATS %VOTES) can be considered the first derivative. Researchers find Partisan Bias a
useful measure of redistricting, and one can then speculate that the distortion
variable is also equally useful. Several studies could be conducted to confirm the
validity of the distortion variable including states where: 1) states one party controls
the state legislative bodies and the governor’s office, 2) a second political party
controls one legislative body or governor’s office (mixed control), and 3) committees
are used to develop redistricting boundaries.
At first glance the distortion variable does appear to be a useful tool for analyzing
the ability the dominant state or local political party to redistrict its space for its
political advantage. Appendix A provides another analysis of how well the party in
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charge of redistricting maintains control of the districts it wins in the first election
following a new census for the 5 elections following that census.
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VIII. APPENDIX A: MEASURING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
REDISTRICTING PLANS
Well-constructed redistricting plans in Texas should create safe districts for the
party controlling both legislative houses and the governor’s office for five elections
using the redistricting plan created following a new census. The plan should also
constrain the opposition party to a minimum of districts, which are vulnerable to
takeover by the dominant party, for example, if an opposition incumbent retires.
Using the database developed for this thesis, this idea can be examined.
For this analysis, the party that wins the first election in a new census period in a
district “owns” the district for the five elections. Theoretically, it should win the district
for the remaining four elections. Figure 15 shows the results for the census periods
between 1972 and 2014.
In the 5 elections beginning in 1972 following the 1970 census, for example, the
Democrats won 20 seats in that 1972 election. For this analysis they “owned” 20
seats and are measured on their ability to maintain control of those 20 seats. In that
period the Democrats won all (100%) of the elections in 17 of the 20 districts (85%).
They lost one or more elections in 3 districts (15%). The comparable Republican
results are also shown.
The results for 2002 are not included because it was only one election.
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Census(total
seats)

1970(24)
1980(27)
1990(30)
2000(32)*
2010(36)**

Democrats
# Districts
20
22
21
12
12

100%
17
17
16
9
10

Republicans

Percent <100% Percent
85
3
15
77
5
23
76
5
24
75
3
25
83
2
17

# Districts 100%
4
2
5
5
9
8
20
19
24
24

Percent <100% Percent
50
2
50
100
0
0
89
1
11
95
1
5
100
0
0

* Includes only 4 elections following 2003 re-redistricting. 2002 election not included
** Includes only 2 elections following 2010 census (2012 and 2014)

Figure 15. Ability of Parties to Maintain their Seats in the Census Decades between
1970 and 2010.
This simple analysis shows the Democrats had increasing difficulty maintaining
100% control of their seats in the 1980s and 1990s as the percentage of seats they
maintained for the 5 elections in those decades declined from 85% to 77% to 76%.
This simple finding is consistent with the increasing influence of the Republicans in
those decades. In the 6 elections following the 2003 re-redistricting, the Republicans
have maintained control of 43 of the 44 seats (98%) they’ve “owned”.
While this analysis may be interesting, comparable results from other states with
which to compare it were not available. The study of the effectiveness of the
dominant party following a new census to redistrict their state to their lasting
advantage is an interesting topic for further research.
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